The Bounds of Freedom: Kant’s Causal Theory of Action
Robert Greenberg
Greenberg tackles one of Kant’s most difficult ideas: that we can be the cause of our actions only if the act of our will is free of everything that makes up who we are as individuals. This entails that our free will does not exist in the same time that includes our individuality. The key is an analysis of Kant’s concept of an action, which includes the will as the cause of the action; so included, the causal connection is àtemporal.
Tahun:
2016
Penerbit:
Walter de Gruyter
Bahasa:
english
ISBN 10:
3110494663
ISBN 13:
9783110494662
Nama seri:
Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte 191
File:
PDF, 1.08 MB
IPFS:
,
english, 2016